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An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Canadian Economic  Association  Meetings in
Kingston, Ontario, Canada in June 1991. The author is grateful to Shabid Yusuf, Boris Plescovic,
(World Bank),  Professor  Robin  Boadway (Queens University) and  Mr.  Douglas H.  Clark,
(Ministry/Department of Finance, Govermnent of Canada) for helpful comments.1.0  Introduction
The existing structure of intereovernmental  fiscal relations in Canada has occasionally  been
portrayed as a textbook example  of an almost optimal  design. The division of powers and transfers in
Canada are broadly  consistent  with the prevalent  views on fiscal federalism  and many countries around
the world including Russia, China and european  economies  in transition are interested  in lessons from
the Canadian  experience  with federalism.  An area of foremost  interest in this respect is its equalization
program which has received rave reviews and has been described as a "glue that holds the federation
together" (Courchene, 1984)  and advocated  as model for other countries  to adapt  and follow (see Shah,
1991a, 1991c). The existing fiscal equalization  program, however, attempts to equalize per capita tax
burden alone and completely  ignores the expenditure  side. This paper  examines  the consequences  of this
neglect  both conceptually  as well as empiricallv.
The paper concludes  that a program  of equalization  that ignores  the expenditure  side cannot be
defended on economic efficiency  and equity grounds. The paper suggests  that the present system of
equalization  in Canada could  be improved  by explicitly  incorporating  relative expenditure  needs of the
Canadian  provinces  into the formula. The paper further proposes  two alternate objective  methodologies
to measure expenditure  needs of the Canadian  provinces  and provides tentative  calculations  of the fiscal
needs of the Canadian provinces under a comprehensive  program of equalization.  These calculations
understandably  result  in an allocation  of Lransfers  among  provinces  which  is significantly  at variance  from
the existing equalization  program. The paper further suggests  a two-tiered approach  to equalization  in
Canada. The first tier would be a federal responsibility  and it would attempt to equalize  the burden of
federal income and commodity  taxes  only. The second  tier would be an interprovincial  equaiization  fund
to be administered  by the Council  of Provincial  Finance  Ministers  and would  comprise  a comprehensive-2-
equalization  system that takes into account provincial  fiscal capacities  as well as expenditure  needs. The
standard  of equalization  would be dietermined  by negotiations.
2.0  Conceptual Basis For Equalization
A theoretical  case for equalization  on equity and efficiency  ground continues  to be clouded in
controversy. Proponents (see Buchanan 1950, 1952, Boadway 1980, 1990 and Boadway and Flatters
1991)  have argued that equalization  transfers  by p  .tting  equal fiscal treatment  of identical  persons in
a federation  promotes  equity. Such  transfers by discouraoing  fiscally  induced  migration  and by enabling
Canadian provinces  to provide certain minimum  standards of public services reduce barriers to factor
mobility  and therefore, enhance economic  efficiency. Boadway,  Roberts and Shah (1993) have argued
that equalization  transfers that reduce net fiscal benefits differentials  create one of those rare instances
in economics  when equity and efficiency  considerations  coincide.
An opposing  viewpoint  questions  the efficiency  and equity  basis  of equalization.  Scott  (1952)  and
Courchene  (1978) have argued  that equalization  payments  to correct fiscal inequities  induce  inefficiency
in the regional allocation  of resources. This happens  because  the grants discourage  the outmigration  of
labor to high income  regions where it would be more productive.  Oates (1984) and Shah (1988, 1989b)
have argued that since capitalization  of taxes and expenditures  is a pervasive  phenomenon,  the case for
equalization  transfers to retard fiscally induced  migration  is extremely  tenuous. In the presence of full
capitalization,  there may not be any efficiency  and equity basis for fiscal equalization  transfers of a
general non-matching  variety, because people in regions with fiscal surpluses  pay relatively more for
private services and less for public services, and vice versa for  regions with fiscal deficiencies.
Capitalization  further ensures  that the existing  home-owners  cannot  avoid  the consequences  of local public
policies by moving  out of the area. Since net benefits are capitalized  into property  values, a capital gain
or loss on account  of the local public sector is realized  at the time of the sale of property. This suggests- 3 -
that in the presence of capitalization,  Tiebout's prescription  that a system of local governments  would
ensure optimal levels of local public services  is not guaranteed  (Shah, 1988, p.211).
Thus the role of equalization  to promote  efficiency  and equity in a federation  and to replicate  the
advantages of a  unitary form of government and at the same time permitting a fully decentralized
provision  -:  f public services  is well recognized  in the literature. Yet as the above  arguments  suggest,  such
a case is by no means universally  acknowledged  either in theory or in practice. For example, inspite of
widely divergent fiscal capacities of US states, there is no federal or interstate equalization  program
currently in place in the USA. Thus equalization  must be recognized  as a matter of political taste. In
Canada, indeed, there is a strong political preference  for such a program as indicated  by the enshrining
of a special equalization  principle in the 1982  Constitution  Act. Section  36.(2) of the Act states:
"Parliament  and the Government  of Canada are comiitted  to the principle of
making  equalization  pay.-ents to ensure  that provincial  goverrnents have sufficienst
revenues  to provide  reasonably  comparable  levels of public  services at reasonably
comparable  levels of taxation."
The following sections reflect upon the design of an  equalization  program that would be
consistent  with the theoretical  case for equalization.
3.0 Implications of the Theory and  the Constitutional MIandate For An Optimal
Design of Equalization Transfers
If one ignores  the conceptual  objections  to equalization  transfers  and instead  embraces  the prevalent
view that equalization  transfers are justified on efficiency  and equity grounds,  what design implications
follow?
Efficiency  Basis of Equalization: The literature on the implications  of economic  theory for an
optimal  design of equalization  transfers is quite limited  and this literature  is heavily influenced  by Robin
Boadway's  views  on this subject.  Boadway  (1980),  Boadway  and Flatters  (1982, 1991),  Boadway,  Flatters
and LeBlanc  (1983) and Auld and Eden (1984) among others have given  some thoughts to devising  an- 4 -
equalization  program based on economic  theory. Boadway  and Flatters (1982) on efficiency  grounds
advocate  complete  elimination  of differences  in net fiscal benefits  across provinces.  This they state calls
for an equalization  scheme  that fully equalizes  differences in both residence  (income taxes) and source
(resource taxes, property taxes, etc.) based tax revenues.  Au!d and Eden (1984) also conclude that a
revenue equalization  program would be consistent  with economic  theory. These prescriptions  are open
to debate. For example, Boadway  and Flatters base their efficiency  arguments  on differential net fiscal
benefits but the revenue equalization  schemJs they recommend  would tend to equalize per capita tax
burden alone. Auld and Eden also implicitly  assume that equal tax treatment  of equals is equivalent  to
equal fiscal treatment  of equals. Courchene  and Copplestone  (1980) rightly point out that:
"..if efficiency  is utilized as the guiding  principle  in reallocating  revenues, then should it not be the
case that the efficiency  criterion be carried over to the production  or expenditure  side as well?"(p.  1JO)
It is refreshing to note that as early as 1959, Musgrave  had a vivid perception of the problem.
Though not unalterably  opposed  to a pure revenue equalization  formula, he argued that such a formula
would enable a provincial government to vote additional services while assuming a fraction of the
increased  cost, thereby encouraging  fiscal irresponsibility.  To rectify  this, he suggests, "that  the principle
of equal tax treatment  of equals  be replaced  by a new rule according  to which people with equal income
should  experience  the same fiscal residue  (imputed  benefits  minus tax costs) or net benefit derived from
budget  operations  (1959, p. 182).  Only an equalization  scheme  that considers  both the differential  revenue
capacities and expenditure  needs would be consistent  with this view. Subsequent  theoretical work of
Musgrave  (1961), Le Grand (1975)  and McMillan  (1981)  is also supportive  of this view. Australia  is the
only federal  country  whic'n  has adopted  such  a comprehensive  (yet  seriously  flawed  in its implementation)
approach  to fiscal equalization.-5  -
Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance and Equalization: This view recognizes the imbalance between
expenditure  needs and revenue  means among  provincial  governments  of Canada  and calls for the tederal
government  to provide  transfers  to the provinces  with relatively  low fiscal capacity  and/or relatively  high
fiscal needs. The idea is to ensure that every Canadian  hds access to reasonably  comparable levels of
public services  within his chosen locality  at a cost in line with what he would pay elsewhere.  This is the
so-called 'fiscal need' principle  which permeates  the writings of the Rowel-Sirois  Commission  (1939),
Hanson  (1961), Graham (1964, 1980), Sharp  (1966), Clark (1983), Courchene  and Copplestone  (1980),
Courchen! (1983) and Shah (1983a, 1983b, 1984a, 1984c). This is also the view enshrined in the
Canadian Consticution  Act 1982, Section 111.36.  These authors have argued that equalization  transfers
should consider  both the expenditurc  needs and the revenue  means of the provinces  in determining  their
equalization  entitlements. Thus the existing representative  tax system should be complemented  by a
representative  expenditure  system.
Horizontal Equity and Equalization: Horizont:' equity refers to the principle that equals should
be treated equally. Buchanan  (1950) extended  this conce.t to fiscal federalism  to mean that the federal
government  should ensure that all its citizens  are treated equally  under the total fisc regardless  of their
place of residence. This is termed as the "broad based" view of fiscal equity by Boadway  and Flatters
(1982) and the Economic  Council of Canada (1982). According  to this view the fiscal system should be
horizontallv  equitable  nationwide  in terms  of the actions  of all governments,  federal, provincial  and local.
rhus individuals  with the same  market income  in the absence  of the public sector should have  equal real
incomes afterwards. In other words, the fiscal system should be locationally  neutral. The Canadian
residents with similar incomes across provinces should receive the same net benefits (imputed public
service  benefits  less tax costs). Only  an equalization  program  which  takes  account of both the expenditure
needs and revenue means of provinces  would  be consistent  with this broad based view.A somewhat  different view of fiscal equity is called the narrow-based"  view by Boadway and
Flatters (1982). This view proposes  that the federal go:.wnment  should take as a starting point the level
of real income  attained  by persons  after provincial  (and perhaps  local) fiscal impacts  have  been accounted
for. The federal government,  according  to this view, should  only be concerned  with equal fiscal treatment
of Canadian residents with cespect to its own actions alon;. Boadway and Flatters argue that in the
Canadian context, a  "narrow based" view of horizontal  fiscal equity is more appropriate because the
Canadian  Constitution  vests ownership  rights of natural resources with the provinces.  According  to this
view, fiscal inequity  arises only because  the federal  government  defines  personal  income  for tax purposes
differently  'from  a household's  corn-rehensive  real (or true) income.  To correct for this inequity,  Boadway
ar.d Flatters (1982) recommend  that only differences in net fiscal benefits multiplied by the federal
average marglnal  income  tax rate be equlalized.  This according  to Boadway,  Flatters and LeBlanc  (1983,
p.178) would require (partial)  equalizing  22.5% and 45.75% of source based taxes and full equalization
of other federal taxe,  The lower limit  on resource  tax equalization  is obtained if the federal government
is assumed  to have no property  rights and the upper limit  if it claims  30% -roperty rights. Auld and Eden
(1984) also agree with this narrow view of horizontal  equity but conclude  that it implies that there be
complete  equalization  of all provincial-local  revenues  but only partial equalization  of natural resource
rents.  They, however, perceive long term adverse  consequences  for national  unity of such a program
of partial equalization.
Boadway and Flatters (1982) and Auld and Eden (1984) implicitly  assume that public sector
benefits per household are equal across all provinces - an untenable  assumption.  If this assumption  is
relaxed, it does not follow that partial revenue  equalization  alone would suffice  to ensure fiscal equity
consistent with the "narrow-based"  view. Partial expenditure  equalization  also would be required to
partially equalize net fiscal benefits.In conclusion,  economic  theory suggests  that an equalization  program  should attempt to equalize
net fiscal benefits across provinces.  A pure revenue  equalization  system  alone is not likely to accomplish
such an objective  or even a more modest  one of ensur.ng  "reasonably  comparable  levels  of public  services
at reasonably  comparable  levels  of taxation"  to Canadian  residents  at large. Optimality  requires  th._t  the
equalization  formula should take into account both the revenue  and the expenditure  sides of provincial
local budgetary  operations.  The existing  program  of equalization  in C.  , could  therefore, be improved
by explicitly incorporating  expenditure  need into the formula. Expenditure  need equalization  would also
help overcome  some  serious limitations  of the existing  program  noted  by leading  academics.  For example,
Professor Courchene  (1984, pp.405-406)  notes that:
"...while  the  potential exists for  equalization to  enhance economic efficiency,  it seems  highly
unlikely that any of Canada's recent equalization  programs could be defended on efficiency
grounds.  Indeed  it would  appear  that  RFPS (Representative  Five Provim.e  Standard)  like  the RNAS
(Representative  National Average  Standard)  before it, inhibits  tihe  optimal  outmigration  from the
eastern provinces  to Ontario  and encourages  excess migration  from Ontario  to energy producing
provinces".
Finally, under a fiscal  need approach,  equalization  would  assume an overarching  role in federal--
provincial  fiscal arrangements.  It would be a residual  program incorporating  any changes  in the funding
of other federal programs.- 8 -
4.0 Alternative Approaches to  the Measurement of the Expenditure Needs oT
Subnational  Governments
Expenditure  need have craditionally  been  thought  to be much  more  difficult  to define  and measure
than is its revenue equivalent, fiscal capacity. There is no doubt that in Canada the difficulties oi
measurement  are greater for expenditure  needs than for fiscal  capacity.  These  difficulties,  however, may
be overstated. Break (1980) referring to the United States, writes that the difficulties involved in
measuring  expenditure  need  are about  the same  as those encountered  in using a represf  ntative  tax system
to measure fiscal capacity. BreaK  states that in order to measure expenditure  need, it is necessary to
define an  equalization standard; to  determine differential costs due to  differences in  input-output
relationships,  nrtlre of service  areas and the composition  of population;  and to distinguish  between  those
need/cost  differentials  that are due to differential  tastes  or inherent  cost disabilities  and those .hat are due
Lo  policy decisions.  It may also be necessary  to identify  and measure  differentials  that are attributable  to
strategic behavior  on the part of provinces  in respect of federal transfer payments. These steps will, in
some cases, involve formidable  difficulties.  However, other federations, including  Australia, Germany
and Switzerland are attempting  to address at least some of these problems in their own equalization
programs. The need to do so in Canada is increased  by the explicit  reference  to "reasonably  comparable
levels of public services" that is contained  in subsection  36(2) of the Constitution  Act, 1982  which sets
out the commitment  of the Government  of Canada  to the principle  of making  equalization  payments.
A number of Canadian  writers have concerned  themselves  with the measurement  of expenditure
needs. These include  Hanson  (1961), Clark (1969,1983),  and Courchene  (1984). The various  approaches
proposed by these authors are summarized  in Shah (1984a). These authors, in general, and Courchene
in particular, show  a vivid  perception  of various  conceptual  steps  involved  vet they  fail to develop  feasible
and objective  operational  approaches.  Similarly,  fiscal need approaches  used by the Canadian  provinces,
Australia, Germany and Switzerland  while interesting  do not hold any promise of satisfying  the fiscal-9  -
need criteria in an objective  yet cotmprehensive  manner. These approaches  are briefly reviewed  here and
a  reader is invited to  refer to Shah (1983c, 1984a) for formulae and technical details and critical
commentary.
The Australian Apporoach: Of all federal countries, Australia is best noted for its balanced
emphasis on expenditure need and revenue means factors in determining state relativities for the
distribution of  lnconditional equalization transfers. Shah (1983c,  1984a) provides details of  the
methodology  adopted  by the Australian  Grants  Commission  in assessing  needs of the member  states. Very
briefly, the Commission  measures  each state's expenditure  needs for a service  or category of expenditure
by calculating  the differential  cost, for the state whose needs are being assessed, of providing  services
of a standard  level, range and quality as determined  by the Commissioners  by examining  relevant data
and making field visits. Socio-demographic  composition,  population  density, urbanization  and physical
environment  figure prominently  in assessing  differential  costs. A state's expenditure  need as measured
by these procedures  could be either positive  or negative.
The Australian  approach is commendable  for its comprehensiveness  yet the procedures  used for
the assessment  of both revenue and expenditure  need appear to be somewhat  crude, imprecise and
subjective. Expenditure equalization appear to  place too  much reliance on demographic factors.
Determinants  of expenditure  need are arr-ved  at using  broad judgement  rather than any hard quantitative
analysis. The procedure involves  a detailed  analysis  of budgetary  data and then subjective  assessment  of
relative need,  following written and  oral  arguments about principles and  methods in  adversary
proceedings. The process adopted is unnecessarily  cumbersome,  unduly time consuming  and places too
much reliance on broad judgement. Such a process could only work if an atmosphere  of exceptionally
high degree of compromise,  cooperation  and accomrnodation  prevailed  among  the governments  involved.- 10 -
Therefore, while the Australians  have done a great deal of work over a period of many years it seems
unlikely that their approach  is suitable  for application  in Canada.
Germany  and Switzerland:  Germany  and Switzerland  also incorporate  expenditure  needs in fiscal
equalization  but their approaches  are not nearly as comprehensive  as the Australian  model. In Germany,
average nation-wide  tax revenue per capita is used as the proxy for expenditure  need for each lander.
Adjustment  to this measure are then made to reflect the presence of "special  burdens". In local fiscal
equalization, many types of burdeps are taken into consideration  but at the lander level only two
modifications of the average per capita figure are used, both of which, however, relate to  local
government. A local governrment  population  size adjustment  is done to recognize  the higher per capita
cost for larger communities  (local governments).  A graduated population density adjustment is also
applied. After these two modifications  have  been applied, "tax-need"  figures are calculated  separately  for
lander taxes, and for the local taxes  to the extent they are included.  Taken together they form the lander
tax-need indicator.  This indicator  is then compared  to tax potential  indicator  to determine  fiscal surplus
or deficiency  of a state. Actual  equalization  entitlements  are then determined  with reference  to a standard
equal to a fraction (92 percent in recent years) of the national  average per capita.
Swiss  formula  for expenditure  need  considers  population  density,  cultivatable  surface  area, surface
area cultivatable  in mountainous  regions, surface area economically  productive.  The formula recognizes
special  needs due to higher  servicing  costs of cantons  with mountainous  regions. It assumes  that the costs
of providing  minimum standards  of public services is higher the larger the mountainous  zone and the
lower the population  density, hence it provides compensation  for these two factors. As fiscal needs are
assumed  to vary inversely  with the composite  index of density, the index  is constructed in such a way
that it stays constant  for density  levels higher than the national  average.
Canadian Provinces: The Canadian  provinces  use simple measures  of expenditure  need in their
general purpose  transfers to municipalities  (see Table 1). The most sophisticated  of these approaches  is- 11 -
the one taken by Saskatchewan.  In that province, the standard municipal expenditure of a class of
municipalities  is assumed  to be a function  of total population  of the class and regression  analysis  is used
to derive a graduated  standard  per capita  expenditure  table for municipal  governments  by population  class.
In general, the methodologies  developed  by the Canadian  provinces  for measuring  expenditure  needs do
not take detailed account of differences  among municipalities  in the cost of and need for such services.
However, they do indicate an emphasis  on the expenditure  side of public finance, which is at present,
lacking  in the federal government's  fiscal equalization  program. It is doubtful  that the expenditure  need
criteria used by the provinces  could be used in the federal program  because  they relate to only a subset
of public services  and because  they relate to such a large number  of governmental  units (as compared  to
ten units in the federal prograrn) that the task  of developing  realistic  measures is much more difficult.
It may, nevertheless  be instructive  to list the various  expenditure  need elements  used by various  provinces
in order to allocate their general purpose (unconditional)  grants among municipalities.  These include;
population size, population  density, population growth factors, road length, dwelling units, location
factors  (e.g. northern  location),  urbanization  factors  (primary  urban population  and urban/rural  class) and
social assistance  payments  (see Shah 1983c).
Courchene (1984):  Professor Courchene has over the years made many eloquent pleas for
introducing  a fiscal need approach to equalization  in Canada. He has argued that:(a) It costs more per
capita  to financt some programs in certain provinces  than in others. Hence  a pure equalization  program
would not ensure comparable  levels of services across provinces; (b) A constitutional  challenge  to the
existing  program could be mounted  on the grounds  that it does not take expenditure  needs into account
and, therefore,  does not ensure that provinces  have  sufficient  revenues  to provide  reasonably  comparable
levels of public services; and (c) A fiscal need approach would automatically  take into account any
changes in  funding of  other federal programs. This  is because under an  expenditure approach,- 12 -
equalization  would  be a residual  program  incorporating  any alteration  elsewhere  in the federal-provincial
finance area and ensuring that provincial  finances come up to the agreed upon level. The following
expression  for an expenditure  related equalization  program by Courchene  (1984) illustrates  this point:
Per Capita Equalization  For Province  i
EQUALS
Proxy for per capita expenditure  need
Minus
Proxy for province i's ability in per capita terms to finance  public services
Minus
All federal transfers to province i
Courchene has argued that an equalization  program designed along the lines of the above
expression  would  become  the overarching  aspect  of federal-provincial  fiscal arrangements.  This he stated
was not true of the existing program. Under the existing  program, Ottawa can increase or decrease its
share of funding for the established  programs or the Canada Assistance  Plan and this will not have an
impact oni  equalization  entitlements.  He said:
"In my views, the expenditure  approach,  incorporating  as it does the rest of the interprovincial
financial interface, might be preferred to the existing  approaches, which treat equalization  in
considerable,  or even complete,  isolation  from other federal-provincial  transfers" (p.273)
The above  discussion  indicates  that while  the felt need  for a fiscal need  approach  to equalization
is quite strong, only limited  operational  guidance  is available  to Canada if at sometimes  in the future it
wished  to complement  existing  representative  tax system  (RTS)  with a system  that considered  expenditure
need as well. Clark (1983) and Courchene (1984) have advocated  the desirability of developing a
representative  expenditure  system  that would  complement  the existing  RTS yet they did not implementor- 13 -
even  fully elaborate  how such a system  would  work. Shah  (1984a, 1984c)  sketched  out details of possible
approaches  to this issue as well as presented  some preliminary  results. The following  sections  carry the
work initiated by Shah further and elaborate and implement  two alternate empirical approaches  to the
measurement  of expenditure  needs  of the Canadian  provinces.  It must be emphasized  that the calculations
presented here are extremely  tentative  as these are based on data that is dated yet they serve important
objectives.  They demonstrate  that technology  does  exist  to measure  expenditure  needs  objectively  and that
the redistributive  thrust of a comprehensive  equalization  system is likely to be very different from the
current program.
5.0  The Representative Expenditure System
A  representative expenditure system  (hereafter  cal!ed  RES)  takes  the  consolidated
provincial-local  expenditures  disaggregated  into major functions  as the basis for calculating  differential
expendituie needs. More specifically, the following steps are involved in making expenditure need
determination.
Step I:
(1)  Disaggregation  of Consolidated  Provincial-Local-Hospital  functions  into major categories
e.g. transportation  and communications;  health etc.
(2)  Identification  of significant  determinants  (Need/cost  factors)
(3)  Quantification  of differential contribution  of these factors in explaining  the expenditure
sub-category  analyzed.
Step II:
(1)  Use results in Step I to determine  relative factor weights.
(2)  Compute an index using these weights to redistribute  a proportion of total expenditures.
The proportion  is determined  based on a percentage  of total variance explained  by given
factors.- 14 -
Step III:
Derivation  of hypothetical  expenditure  by province for each category  of services  based on




Hypothetical  Expenditure  on a subfunction  obtained in Step III
LESS
National Average Weighted  Expenditure  Per Capita For That Subfunction  for the Year
under consideration.
Empirical Implementation  of the Representative  Expenditure  System: The RES is implemented
here by examining  eight categories  of consolidated  provincial-local-hospitals  expenditures  for the period
1971-1981  for each of the ten provinces.  The following  breakdown  of these expenditures  was used:
1. Transportation  and Communications
2. Social Services
3. Health
4. Protective  Services
5. Post-Secondary  Education
6. Elementary  and Secondary  Education
7. General Services
8. Other Expenditures
For each of these categories  of public services,  time series and cross-section  data on relevant
need/cost factors and other determinants  were assembled.  Regression  analysis  was then used to identify
significant  factors. For this purposes,  Kmenta's  pooling  regressions  were estimated  using iterative  systems- 15  -
of simultaneous equations estimation  method. The regression results are reported in Table 2.  This
procedure resulted in an extremely  good overall fit for the system of equations  as a whole (Adjusted R-
Square=0.9997, Log-likelihood  Function=-4169.3  and Chi-Square =  307.9 With 63 D.F.) as well as
good fit for individual  regressions.  These regression results are then used to assign relative weights to
various identified  factors (see Table 3) and also to compute  a composite  index  of relative  need to be used
for developing standardized  expenditures  for each province for the categories  of public expenditures
examined  here. These indices  along with relative  weights assigned  by regression  analysis  to factors that
comprise such indices are reported in Table 3.  It is interesting  to note that for transportation and
education  services regionally  differentiated  price indices receive major weights whereas for health and
police protection, proportion of people in  urban and/or metropolitan areas explain much of  the
interprovincial  variation in expenditures. The factor weights specified in Table 3 are then used to
redistribute  the proportion  of total all provinces expenditures  that are explained  by these factors. Per
capita hypothetical standardized expenditure so  derived is  then compared to  national per  capita
expenditures  to determine  per capita needs for the specified  service. The samne  calculations  are repeated
for all the categories  of expenditures  examined  and aggregate  needs for each province is derived from
a summation  of these  positive  and negative  entitlements  and multiplying  by the relevant  population  figures
(see Table 4). In Table 5, expenditure  needs are updated for the fiscal year 1991-92  by assuming a
growth rate for total entitlements  consistent  with the growth  rate of payments  from the existing  program.
This table suggests  that if a comprehensive  program of equalization  to be administered  by the federal
government  was instituted  in the Year 1991-92,  its redistributive  impact  would  be in favor of Quebec  and
against  the maritime provinces  and Manitoba  and Saskatchewan.  The total equalization  payments  by the
federal government  under such a comprehensive  system are estimated  to be smaller by almost a billion
dollar than the payments  associated  with the current representative  tax system.- 16  -
6.0  An Alternate Approach To the Measurement of Expenditure Needs
The RES approach implemented  above presents itself as a reasonably  objective  procedure to
determine  fiscal needs of the Canadian  provinces.  An econometric  approach  being proposed  here presents
even a rmore  straightforward  and objective  alternative.  The calculation  of expenditure  needs based on this
approaih entails the following  steps:
Step I (Same  as the R.E.S)
(1)  Identification  of significant  factors (Need/cost)
(2)  Differential  contribution  of these factors in explaining  provincial-local  expenditures.
Step II
Evaluation  of regression results for each province  by holding  the fiscal capacity and non--
need factors at national average values and substituting  actual values of the need/cost
variables. The resulting  figures would be the hypothetical  per capita expenditure  for each
subfunction.
Step III
Evaluate  regression results at mean values for all variables  (need as well as fiscal capacity




Hypothetical  per capita  expenditure  (Step II)
LESS
Standardized  per capita expenditure  (Step III)
Table 6 reports these results  for selected  categories  of expenditure  in per capita  terms for the fiscal
year 1981-82. The same results are projected for 1991-92  in Table 7 and combined  with the RTS to
determine  overall entitlements  for each of the provinces.  Note that Quebec, Ontario,  Alberta and British
Columbia qualify  for pos.i  ive expenditure  need entitlements  and all other provinces  qualify  for negative
expenditure  need entitlements.  The summation  of entitlements  under the RTS and the expenditure  needs- 17 -
expenditure  need entitlements.  The summation  of entitlements  under the RTS and the expenditure  needs
results in net negative  entitlements  for Ontario, Alberta and B.C. only. These negative  entitlements  for
a federal program would be ignored. Overall, the proposed system redistributes  transfers in favor of
Quebec  and against  other equalization  receiving  provinces.  Overall  entitlements  for a federal  program  are
estimated  to be higher than the existing program. Finally, Table 8 presents  calculations  of relative costs
(costs  based on need as opposed  to actual  costs)  of public  services  based on the assumption  that each and
every province  is equalized  either upwards  and downwards  to national  average  fiscal capacity. The table
suggests  that the need related required cost of provision  of public services  in the equalization  receiving
provinces except Quebec are uniformly lower than national average. This again reconfirms earlier
conclusions  that a pure revenue equalization  program would be more favorable  to these provinces  than
a comprehensive  equalization  system.
A word of caution is in order here. The calculations  presented  here are based on a comprehensive
yet a dated data set. Quite conceivably  when the same  data set is extended  to 1991-92,  there might well
emerge significant  changes  in regression  coefficients  and the resulting  entitlements.
Concluding  Remarks:
The paper has presented two simple yet objective  approaches  to the measurement  of the fiscal
needs of the Canadian  provinces and also demonstrated  the computational  ease of such calculations.  In
doing so, the paper has made a case for a re-examination  of the existing  equalization  system, a case also
supported  by Courchene  (1984) as follows:
"Even if a fiscal  need approach  is a non-starter  for political,  conceptual  or computational  reasons,
the notion that equalization  could play an overarching  role in terms of balancing  the provinces'
expenditure  needs and revenue  means merits some consideration"  (p.273).- 18  -
If a serious re-examination  of the existing  program of the type discussed  in this paper takes place
in future, it should also address whether or not a fiscal equalization  program should remain a federal
responsibility or  instead become a  shared responsibility. An  ideal equalization program in  most
federations  would be an interstate  fiscal need  equalization  fund which  assesses  both negative  and positive
equalization  grants to member  states  such that  net transfers  equal  zero. Thus the program  by d^^.gn  would
be self-financing.  In Canada, though due to a long tradition of federal involvement  in equalization,
perhaps a preferred  alternative  would  be a two-tiered  program  -a federal  and an interprovincial  pool (see
also Courchene 1984). The first tier would consist of a federal program based on an acceptance  of a
narrower than the "narrow-based"  view of equity as proposed  by Boadway  et al.(1982, 1983). Such a
program would limit federal role to only an area of its strict responsibility  i.e. to equalize  the burden of
federal income and commodity  taxes only either through tax credits to individuals or through direct
equalization  transfers to provincial  governments.  The second  tier would  be an inter-provincial  fiscal need
equalization  fund, to be administered  by the provinces  themselves,  and would assess both negative  and
positive equalization  transfers to provinces such that net transfers equal zero. The latter program is
expected  to bring a greater sense of participation  among  provinces  in the federation  as the contributions
of have-provinces  to have-not  provinces  would be transparent. Such a program would be self financing
and would also eliminate  pressures for increases  in equalization  payments  which a federal program by
its very nature cannot avoid. The proposed  two tier structure would be consistent with the conceptual
basis of equalization  and would afford a built-in mechanism  for enforcing  a discipline  on equalization
payments as two opposing political influences would work to  determine the level of equalization
payments.  The proposed  program  would  further reduce  the financial  squeeze  on the federal budget  placed
by the current system of equalization  payments.- 19 -
ENDNOTES
The existing  equalization  system separates  taxing  and spending  decisions  in maritime  provinces  in
a major way and therefore eliminates  a measure  of local accountability  and might even create incentives
for fiscal mismanagement.  The empirica; evidence  in Shah (1984c) indicates  that the relative costs of
public employment  in the equalization  receiving  provinces  was nine percentage  points higher than the
same in the "have" provinces  in 1982  (average index  of 1.  12 in the "have  not" provinces  vs 1.03 in the
wealthy provinces (Shah, 1984c, Table 5.3)). Could it be that part of the equalization  funds are being
used by the recipient  provinces to provide higher wages for the public service employees  rather than
improved  provision of public services?  This question  merits further study.- 20  -
Table 1:  Canada: Basis of Provincial Unconditional Assistance to Local
Governments
Taxable
Capacity  Tax Effort  Expenditure
Province  Factors  Factors  Needs Factors
Newfoundland  Loss of revenue with  property tax  - population
respect to exemptions  revenues and  - per capita
provided to old age  water and  assistance
pensioners  sewers rates  - road mileage
Prince Edward Island  ---------------------------------  see New  Brunswick-------------------------------------










New Brunswick  property assessment  --  - shareable
(per capita and per  expenditures
road kilometer
Quebec  property assessment  taxes from
local sources
Ontario  property assessment  previous year's  - population




Manitoba  --  --  - population
- urban population






Alberta  property assessment  total tax  - population
revenues  growth in
excess of 5 %
per annum
British  property assessment  - population
Columbia  - expenditure
Source: Shah (1983a)- 21 -
Table 2:  Pooling Regressions
(110 Observations - t ratios are given in parenthesis)
(1)  TC  =  -397.82  +  7488.7  RSPC  +  267.1  NCAR  +  0.264  SNOW
(-4.5)  (5.5)  (4.3)  (4.2)
+  .00399 PMA  +  0.195  AWW  +  410.81  TRUCK
(1.2)  (1.0)  (3.2)
+  .10733 TT  +  .0815  OR  - 13.3  TIME
(3.7)  (7.4)  (-2.8)
+  .00417 GDP
(1.4)  =  0.88
(2)  SS  =  - 246.6  +  2.558  FLFPR  +  5.8  IBR +  .0004  SPF
(-4.2)  (2.2)  (5.2)  (5.3)
+  .04  BP +  1953.8 DD  +  965.37 GIS
(2.4)  (0.4)  (2.2)
- .003 OR  - .156  UT  +  1.8  WELT
(-3.4)  (-6.4)  (10.0)
+  1.3 PGIP +  21.2  TIME
(.20)  (7.8)  R  =  0.92
(3)  HE  =  -21.3  +  .05  P65  +  2.6  BIRTHS +  37.6  HSEP
(-0.6)  (0.4)  (2.7)  (2.4)
+  2318.0 TA  +  0.228  HT  +  0.019  OR
(0.8)  (1.  3)  (1.5)
+  34.0  TIME + 0.009  GDP  - 45.5  NB
(10.7)  (2.7)  (-4.1)
- 169.5 QUE  - 248.7  ONT  - 46.4  SASK
(-2.4)  (-2.5)  (-3.5)
- 64.2 ALTA  - 43.4 BC
(-2.7)  (-1.  9)  k2 =  0.95- 22 -
Table 2: (Cont'd)  Pooling  Regressions
(110 Observaticns  - t ratios  are given in parenthesis)
(4)  PPP  =  -2.2  +  0.03 POPN  +  2751.1 TA  +  .003 GNP
(-0.3)  (5.7)  (3.1)  (2.9)
0.015 TT  +  .013 OR  +  0.14  TIME
(-1.7)  (3.6)  (6.9)  2 =  0.  94
(5)  PSE  =  -7.3  +  3.7 MDNAS  +  0.7  EPI  +  0.013  OR
(-1.1  (4.6)  (8.9)  (4.2)
- 0.104 PSAT - 14.4 NB  - 22.2 QUE
(-  1.  1)  (-3.2)  (-2.0)
- 81.9  ONT - 19.5 SAS  +  27.2  ALTA
(-4.0)  (-3.8)  (3.4)
- 26.3 BC
(4.9)  R2  =  0.91
(6)  ESE  =  6.64  +  0.015 P517  +  1.5 EPI  +  .04 OR
(0.3)  (2.5)  (4.4)  (5.0)
+  0.051 UT +  5.7 TIME
(1.7)  (1.2)  R 2 =  0.92
(7)  GS  =  -22.7  +  0.04 AWW  +  0.18 PD  +  0.07 TT
(-1.9)  (4.0)  (3.0)  (5.6)
+  0.06 OR  +  63.8 QUE
(9.5)  (6.7)  k2 =  0.79
(8)  OE  =  63.5  +  0.125 OR  +  47.9 TIME
(2.6)  (7.6)  (10.2)  k2  =  0.81- 23 -
Table 2 (Cont'd): Variable  Definitions
ALTA  Alberta
AWW  Average  wee!4y  wages - industrial  composite  ($ per person)
BC  British  Columbia
BIRTHS  Births (000)
BP  Blind  personal  allowance  recipients
DD  Persons claiming  disability  deduction  (Tax Returns Data)
EPI  Education  Price Index (1981 - 1.00)
ESE  Provincial-local  expenditures  on elementary  and secondary  education  ($ per capita).
FLFPR  Female Labor Force Participation  Rate (%)
GDP  Provincial  gross domestic  product  ($ per capita)
- a proxy for property values
GIS  G.I.S. recipients
GS  Provincial-local  expenditures  on General  Services  ($ per capita).
HE  Provincial-local  Expenditures  on Health Care ($ per capita).
HSEP  Number of days of hospital  separations  from all causes (000)
HT  Health transfers ($ per person)
IBR  Number of illegitimate  births per thousands  unmarried  females of child-bearing  age
MDNAS  Full-time  enrollment  In medicine,  dentistry, nursing and applied sciences.
NB  New Brunswick
NCAR  Proportion  of area that is non-cultivatable
ONT  Ontario
OR  Provincial-local  revenues  from own sources ($ per capita)
PD  Population  density- 24 -
Table 2 Cont'd: Variable  Definitions  (Cont'd).
PGIP  Provincial  government  in power by political affiliation
(Dummy  =  0 for PCS, SOCREDS
I for liberal, NDP)
P517  Population  5-17 years (000)
PMA  Population  in metropolitan  areas (000)
POPM  Male population  in age group 16-24 (000)
PPP  Provincial-local  expenditures  on protection  of persons and property  ($ per capita).
PSE  Provincial-local  Expenditures  on post-secondary  education  ($ per capita).
PSET  Federal-provincial  cash and tax transfers for post-secondary  education  ($ per capita)
P65  Population  65 years and over (000)
QUE  Quebec
Dummy for the province  of Quebec
RSPC  Paved roads and streets kilometerage  per capita
SASK  Saskatchewan
SPF  Single  parent families  (000)
SNOW  Snowfall  (in centimeters)
SS  Provincial-local  expenditures  on social services  and welfare  ($ per capita).
TA  Number of traffic accidents  involving  injury or death
TC  Provincial-local  expenditures  on transportation  and communication  ($ per capita).
TIME  Time trend
TRUCK  Conmmercial  vehicles registrations  (per capita)
TT  Total federal-provincial  transfers ($ per capita)
UT  Federal-provincial  unconditional  transfers ($ per capita)
WELT  Federal-provincial  welfare transfers ($ per capita)- 25  -
Table 3:  Factor Weights for the R.E.S.
Expenditure  Category  Need/Cost  Factors  Relative  Weights
Transportation  & Communications  Snowfall  (Annual  - in centimeters)  SNOW  0.1020
Highway  Construction  Price  Index  (HCPI)  0.6580
Paved  roads  and streets  per square
kilometer  of area (RSPR)  0.0005
Non-cultivatable  Area as a proportion
of total  area (NCAR)  0.2357
Total  1.000
Index=(0.10*ISNOW  +0.66*IHCPI  + 0.0005*IRSPR  + 0.24*INCAR)*ISRP
Post-Secondary  Education  (PSE)  Full time enrollment  in grade 13+(000)(PSS)  0.048
Percentage  of Population  having  a minority
language  as mother  tongue  (ML)  0.190
Provincial  Unemployment  Rate  (UR)  0.018
Education  Price  Index  (EPI)  0.717
Help Wanted  Index  (HWI)  0.010
Foreign  Post-Secondary  Students  (FPS)  0.017
Total  1.000
Index=(0.18*IPSS  + .70*IML  + .08*IUR  + .04*IFPS)*IHWI*IEPI
Elementary  and Secondary  Population  under 18  (PO17)  0.014
Education  (ESE)  Population  Density  (PD)  0.017
Education  Price  Index  (EPI)  0.969
Total  1.000
Index  = (.02*IPD  +  .98*IEPI)*IP017
Health  (HE)  Alcoholism  (Hospital  separations  for Alcohol
related  cases)  (ALCO)  0.123
Urban  Population  (PU)  0.877
Total  1.000
Index=(0.123*IALCO  +  0.877*IPU)- 26  -
Table 3 Cont'd:  Factor Weights for the R.E.S.
Expenditure Category  Need/Cost Factors  Relative Weights
Social Services (SS)  Single Parent Families (SPF)  1.00
Police Protection  Criminal Code Offenses (CCO)  0.39
Proportion of Population in Metropolitan  0.61
(PMAR) Areas
Total  1.00
Index=(.39*ICCO  +  .61*IPMAR)
General Services (GS)  Private sector wages (Industrial  0.769
composite) (AMW)
Percentage of population having a minority  0.001
language as mother tongue (ML)
Population Density (PD)  0.023
Population (POPF)  0.039
Snowfall (Annual - in centimeters) (SNOW)  0.168
Total  1,000
Index=(.001*ML  + 0.175*ISNOW + 0.80*IAMW +  .024*IPD)*IPOPF
Note: Calculations based on regression coefficients.The use of a variable prefixed by I means that a relative index of the variable
is used.- 27 -
Table 4:  Expenditure  Need Equalization  Entitlements  ($1,000s)
For the 1981-82  Fiscal Year
A Summary
NFLD  P.E.I.  N.S.  N.B.  QUE.  ONT.  MAN.  SASK.  ALTA.  B.C.
Transportation  26460  4264  23192  30523  -33386  -81929  27956  35075  -24094  17117
and Communication
Social Services  -10420  -2698  -23879  -33674  124746  112291  -7777  5773  -67251  -97199
and Welfare
Health Services  -104572  -23909  -138270 -121823  299878  812901  -154874  -141592  -210900  -216861
Protection of Persons
and Property  -28375  -5966  -35036  -25755  -33738  111284  -18075  -12932  29100  19492
Post-Secondary
Education  -28407  -6570  -37575  -32907  30707  348366  -46082  45323  -74544  -i07576
Elementary and Secondary
Education  6885  360  -8900  -6720  172915  -106613  -19465  -6679  -28220  -3032
General Services  -1084  -148  -299  -598  -2331  1974  -2508  -1476  2297  4222
Total  -160560  -39406  -246285 -212822  593500  1398305  -277572  -199288  419668  436142- 28 -
Table 5:  Equalization  Entitlements  for the 1991-92  Fiscal Year (Millions  $)
Based  Upon a Comprehensive  Equalization  System I
(illustrative  Calculations)
Entitlements  Under  Entitlements  Under  Entitlements  Under a
the Existing  Representative  the Proposed  Representative  Fiscal Need Approach  I
Tax System (RTS)  Expenditure  System  (RES)  (RTS + RES)
(a)  (b)  (c) =  (a) +  (b)
Newfoundland  972  -311  661
Prince Edward Island  211  -75  136
Nova Scotia  970  -475  494
New  Brunswick  939  -409  529
Quebec  3899  1145  5044
Ontario  -5022  2701  -2321
Manitoba  958  -537  421
Saskatchewan  517  -384  133
Alberta  -4321  -811  -5132
British  Columbia  -890  -842  -1732
Total  8466  0  7418
Source: Author's calculations.- 29  -
Table 6:  Expenditure Neeos Based on Econometric Analysis
(1981-82-Fiscal Year)
Elementary  Post-  Transportations  Total
Police  General  & Secondary  Secondary  and  Social  Health  per
Protection  Services  Education  Education  Communications  Services  Services  Capita
Newfoundland  -22  5  12  23  -16  -43  -23  -63
Price Edwards Islands  -28  -9  26  13  -2  -47  -54  -100
Nova Scotia  -5  -10  1  2  0  -38  -27  -76
New Brunswick  -11  -10  -6  -2  13  -40  -33  -87
Quebec  20  3  28  14  11  35  33  145
Ontario  15  -5  -22  -16  -3  52  54  75
Manitoba  13  -23  -29  -4  -3  20  -2  -29
Saskatchewan  -11  -19  -13  -19  12  21  -21  -50
Alberta  3  1  -19  26  13  -25  11  11
British Columbia  9  -6  -6  -26  -8  44  22  30Table 7:  Equalization Entitlements for the 1991-92  Fiscal Year (Milion $)
Based Upon a Comprehensive  Equalization System II
(Illustrative Calculations)
Entitlements  Under  Expenditure  Need  Entitlements  Under
the Existing  Representative  Entitlements  Using  Econometric  a Fiscal Need
Tax System  (RTS)  Analysis  (EA)  (RTS+EA) Approach  II
(a)  (b)  (c) = (a) + (b)
Newfoundland  972  -69  903
Prince Edwards  Islands  211  -25  186
Nova Scotia  970  -130  840
New Brunswick  939  -120  818
Quebec  3899  1888  5186
Ontario  -5022  1436  -3586
Manitoba  958  -61  897
Saskatchewan  517  -94  423
Alberta  -4321  53  -4268
British  Columbia  -890  183  -706
TOTAL*  8466  0  9253
*Ignores  negative  entitlements  for (a) and (b).
Source: Author's caiculations.- 31 -
Table 8:  Indexes of Relative Costs (Needs) for Public Services for
If Each and Every Province Had the National Average Fiscal Capacity
For the 1981-82 Fiscal Year
NFLD  P.E.I  N.S.  N.B.  QUE.  ONT  MAN.  SASK.  ALTA.  B.C.
Transportation  109.15  105.48  103.16  108.29  93.02  91.67  95.48  105.92  91.28  96.47
and Communication
Social Services and
Welfare  99.24  98.36  96.89  92.07  108.25  106.73  101.81  105.05  96.44  95.16
Health Services  86.61  84.76  90.15  88.17  125.49  133.52  92.21  93.00  101.76  104.33
Protection of Persons
and Property  81.76  82.49  86.69  89.18  107.30  117.65  100.23  102.66  117.71  114.34
Post-Secondary
Education  89.70  87.71  92.86  91.24  120.03  139.75  92.54  91.49  98.96  95.70
Elementary and Secondary
Education  102.43  100.95  98.80  98.94  104.79  98.50  97.44  99.38  98.46  100.31
General Services  99.48  99.75  100.09  99.89  100.09  100.32  99.27  99.63  100.63  100.84
Total  95.84  94.31  95.53  94.94  110.57  113.32  96.32  98.86  99.58  100.71- 32 -
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